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I.
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Pamela A.
Chaffin (hereinafter Chaffin), and the Appellee, Albertsons, Inc.
(hereinafter Albertsons).
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IV.
JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction in this matter was vested in the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to 78-2-2
Jurisdiction

(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953.

is now properly vested

in the Court of Appeals

pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated

1953

(as

amended), Sec. 78-2-4 (4) and Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (k) .
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed
reversible

error

by

granting

Albertsons

Motion

for

Summary

Judgement and dismissing the appellant's Complaint with prejudice.
Summary Judgement is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgement as a matter of law.
courts determination

No deference is given to the trial

of whether there are material

facts in

dispute, but a review of the facts and inferences drawn there from
are viewed in a light most favorable to the losing party.

Any

doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are resolved in
favor of the losing party and any legal conclusions are reviewed
for correctness with no deference given to the trial court.
Canfield v. Albertsons. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992).

Citations

omitted.
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
R u l e 56 (c) of t h '
a u t h o r i t y on app* u l .

U.R.Civ.F. i s
1

the

sole

determinative

Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent parts;
"The judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter
of law."
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Chaffin brought this action to recover damages for injuries
she sustained when she slipped and fell in water left by a floor
cleaning machine owned by Albertsons in an Albertsons supermarket
on January 3, 1991 at or about 7:00 a.m.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 11, 1991 which
defendant answered on December 30, 1991. After interrogatories of
both parties and the depositions taken of plaintiff and Allen
Morley,

an Albertsons1

agent/employee, a Motion

Judgement was filed by Albertsons on May 5, 1993.

For

Summary

Oral argument

was heard on June 23, 1993 and at that time Motion For Summary
Judgement was denied.

Defendants renewed their motion on October

8, 1993 and this was argued on November 5, 1993 and Summary
Judgement was granted.

The order was signed by Judge Richard H.

Moffat of the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah and
entered on November 15, 1993.

2

VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These facts are largely stated in a light most favorable to
appellant which is how they must be reviewed by an appellate court
in reviewing an appeal by the losing party from a Motion For
Summary Judgement.
1.

That on January 3, 1991, plaintiff drove her automobile

and parked near the front entrance of the Albertsons Tayorsville
store located at 1825 West 4700 South sometime between the hours
of 6:15 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.
2.

(Record at 102 and 374).

She entered the market in low heeled pumps and proceeded

to the bakery near the front of the store.

She picked up one bran

muffin from the bakery and proceeded down another aisle and picked
up a bottle of soda pop and walked to the back of the store and
turned left and was walking back to the dairy department.

(Record

at 378 line 23 - 380 line 12, 391 and 455).
3.

She looked up and saw a flooring cleaning machine coming

out of one aisle.
4.
aisle.

(Record at 380-81).

She saw "^his machine make a turn and proceed down another
(Record at 381).

5.

She took a couple of steps and her feet went out from

under her.
6.

(Record at 381) .

Shp sat there stunned and dazed for a few minutes and when

she got up she noticed some sudsy water

(Record at 383) and a

puddle of water approximately one foot in diameter.
388-90) .
3

(Record at

7. The floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water was
purchased and owned by Albertsons.

(Record at 343-44) .

8. That the times and hours of the cleaning of the floors by
the operator of the machine were dictated by Albertsons.

(Record

at 316-17, 342-43).
9.

That the day was clear and cold with the snow having

fallen a couple of days before the accident.

(Record at 373-374).

IX.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Issues of material fact that arise from reasonable

inferences to be submitted to a jury are present in this case and
this case should be remanded to the lower court for a trial.
2.

Chaffin does not have to show that Albertsons had notice

of the wet spot on the floor in which she slipped and fell if the
following exceptions to the notice requirement are present in this
case:
a. That Albertsons purchased, owned, and controlled the
floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water.
b. That Albertsons dictated the time that the floor
cleaning machine was used with the fact that there was
a conflict with the floor cleaning machine and stocking
of shelves by Albertson's employee on the morning in the
Albertsons store.
3.

The following facts;
a. That the floor cleaning machine had passed over
the area immediately before plaintiff slipped and
fell.
b. That the water in which plaintiff slipped was
sudsy.
c. That the spot on the floor was similar to a spot
of water one would see after mopping a floor;

4.

Give rise to the reasonable inferences that;
a. Sudsy water in the back of a food store is not
a hazard that is normally encountered in a store
unless placed there by such an article as a floor
cleaning machine.
b.
That sudsy soapy water normally would not be
tracked in by a user of a market.
c.
That the floor cleaning machine left the wet
spot that Chaffin slipped in.

5.
The collective wisdom of a jury is great enough to
determine and make a factual finding of whether or not there is a
reasonable inference this water came from the floor cleaning
machine or was left by a phantom shopper.
6. Summary judgement was inappropriate in this case and this
should be remanded to the District Court for trial.
X.
ARGUMENT A
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THERE ARE GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL PACT AND THE MOVING PARTY IS NOT ENTITLED
TO A JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OP LAW.
The trial court may render summary judgement only if;
a.

There are no genuine issue of material facts; and

b.

The moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of

law. U.R.Civ.P. 56 (c) ; Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. . 814 P.2d
623 (Ut. App. 1991); Canfield v. Albertsons at 1225.
Summary judgement is only appropriate when a party makes a
showing which precludes as a matter of law, the award of relief to
a non-moving party. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbee Ins. Co. 594
P.2d 332 (Utah 1979).
This court, in considering a Motion For Summary Judgement must
view any doubts or ^ncertainities concerning issues of fact in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party.
5

Silcox v. Skaggs

Alpha Beta, Inc., at 624. "Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable
inferences in determining whether there is a material issue of fact
which precludes Summary Judgement." Robinson v. IHC, 74 0 P. 2d 2 62,
263 (Utah App 1987) citations omitted.
Cases involving negligence are not normally appropriate for
summary judgment as the question of negligence is a factual issue
to be determined by a jury.
(Utah

1983);

"Summary

Webster v. Seal, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172

Jackson v Dabney, 645 P.2d

613,615

(Utah

judgement should be granted with great caution

negligence is alleged."

1982);
where

Silcox v. Skaqqs Alpha Beta, Inc. at 1154;

[Quoting English v Kienke, 774 P. 2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) cert.
granted 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989)].
XI.
ARGUMENT B
THAT THE PACTS AND INFERENCES RAISED BY APPELLANT VIEWED IN
A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT SHOULD PRECLUDE SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

defined

an

inference

or

a

presumption of fact as lfa logical and reasonable conclusion of the
existence of a fact in the case, not presented by direct evidence
as to the existence of the fact itself, but inferred from the
establishment of other facts from which, by the process of logic
and reason, based upon common experience, the existence of the
assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact."

Wvatt v.

Baucrhman, 239 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 1951); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 881 (Utah 1981).
The law recognizes that certain facts may be pieced together
6

like a puzzle by the fact finder to reach an ultimate conclusion.
The Model Utah Jury Instructions recognize this by instruction 2.17
which states;
A
fact may
be proved
by circumstantial
evidence.
Circumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances
that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the
facts sought to be proved.
In this case, if the evidence had been viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, tht ,. the lower court should have found
the following:
FACT NO 1.

That the floor cleaning machine had just passed

over the area where the plaintiff had slipped
Deposition testimony and exhibits submitted by Chaffin and
Allen Morley, an agent/employee of Albertsons, clearly show the
floor cleaning machine had just scrubbed the area in question.
Morley, the employee running the machine for Albertsons and a
favorable witners for the appellees stated:
A: [By Allen Morley] "I was in the process of scrubbing the
freezer aisles. (See attached diagram.) I was headed towards
the meat department. As I came to the end of the aisle, I
looked right and saw Pam Chaffin approximately two or three
aisles away from me. I proceeded around the corner to go down
the other side of the freezer aisle. I was about a quarter
of the way down that aisle when I heard a scream. I stopped
the machine and turned around and saw Pamela Chaffin on the
floor." (Record at 321, lines 6-15 and 361, paragraph 2).
A:
[By Mitchel T. Rice] When I came to the end of that
aisle- it would have been aisle nine. That's the approximate
position.
Q:

That's when you very first saw her is that where she was?

A:

Yes.

Qs

Where were you?

A:

I would have been right at the end of the aisle.
7

Q:
Had you started you started rounding in the aisle yet or
were you coming to the end of the aisle?
A:

I was coming to the end of the aisle.

Q:

What were you doing at that time?

A:

Just scrubbing the floor.

Q:

With the cleaning machine we referred to earlier?

A:

Correct.

(Record at 322 lines 8-21).

Q:
[By Rice]
You mentioned further down in the second
paragraph that you were a fourth of the way down the aisle.
I take it that you had rounded that aisle and were headed
north with the cleaning machine the other direction;
correct?
A:

[By Morley]

Correct.

Q:

What aisle is that aisle that you went around?

A:

Eight and nine are the two aisles.

Q:

Eight is which one?

A:

The one on the east.

Q:
So you were headed down north on aisle eight and you were
about a fourth of the way down when you heard a scream?
A:

Correct.

Q:
You mentioned that you turned around and saw Ms. Chaffin;
right?
A:

Correct, yes.

Q:
Did you actually just turn around from where you were and
could see her then or did you have to go back south to see
her?
A:
I had to back up to see her, stopped the machine and
just- turned around and take a few steps back. (Record at 323
line 9 to 324 line 3 and see accompanying Exhibit map at
Record 3 65 as drawn and submitted by Allen Morley in his
deposition).
Chaffin

also made

the

logical
8

conclusion

that

the

floor

cleaning machine had just cleaned the area where she slipped,
Q:

[By Rice]

How do you know it came out from an aisle?

A: [By Chaffin] Because I saw it come out from an aisle and
turn and go down the back aisle. Right as it was coming outI was walking this way, it was coming out and turned, right
at that time I just kind of noticed it being there and then
I went down. (Record at 381, line 8-13).
Q: [By Rice] How did you know then whether it had gone over
the spot marked X on the floor?
A: [By Chaffin] Because he was headed that way and he jumped
off his machine and came back to me to ask me if I was okay.
And also the butcher that was working right there in the meat
department came over at the same time, they both heard meI guess I yelled when I slipped.
Then I just sat there and cried because it hurt so bad.
But he was headed east. He apparently had already been where
1 was and was going that way.
Q: You didn't see the cleaning machine, though, until it was
approximately six to ten feet from where you were?
A:

Right.

Q:

So you did not see it clean the spot where you marked x?

A:

No.

Q:

You did not actually see it go over that spot?

A:

No.

Q: Its very possible it may not have gone over that spot
before you arrived at that spot, is that correct, because you
did not see it?
A:

It could be possible, but that spot was wet it was sudsy.

Qs

So you are just making the assumption that it did?

A:

Yes.

(Record at 382, line 19 to 383, line 18).

Q: [By Rice] Let me go back just a minute. I just thought
of something. Why are you assuming that the cleaning machine
had just come, had just come out from one of the aisles?
A: [By Chaffin]
the aisle.

I'm not assuming, it had come out from

9

Q:

Did you see it come out from the aisle?

A: Yes, it was just turning the corner to go on to the
back- it was just coming .out from one of these aisles and
turning the corner to go to the back aisle.
And a map produced by Allen Morley (Record at 3 65) as part of
his answer to a third party complaint filed by Albertsons against
him clearly shows the fact or raises the inference that Morley came
up aisle nine in using the machine, made a turn down an adjacent
aisle with the machine while cleaning the floor, heard a scream,
was able to easily step off his machine and see plaintiff on the
floor where he had just scrubbed.
FACT 2.

The water was soapy.

Q: [By Rice] It is very possible that it [the machine] may
not have gone over that spot before you arrived at the spot,
is that correct, because you did not see it?
A: [By Chaffin] It could be possible, but that spot was
wet, it was sudsy, (Record at 383 lines 12-16).
FACT 3.
Q:

The machine used soapy water to clean the floors.

[By Rice]

Could you describe that cleaning machine?

A:
[By Morley] Big, awkward and green. Holds water and
soap solution in the tank, you would lay it down, pads would
scrub the floor and the vacuum would pick all the water back
up.
Q:
So the solution was you say, a water and soap mix of
some sort?
A:

Yes.

Q:
And it would distribute that on the floor somehow then
there were pads that would actually buff the floor, clean the
floor?
A:

Yes.

FACT 4.

(Record at 309, lines 10-20).
That the wet spot was similar to what one would
10

encounter after mopping a floor.
Q: [By Rice] I think you already mentioned this.
me what caused you to fall?
A;

[By Chaffin]

Q:

Yes.

A:

I think the floor was wet.

Q:

So a wet spot on the floor?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you notice that wet spot before you fell?

A:

No.

Q:

When did you see the wet spot?

Again tell

What I think caused me to fall?

A: When both men took me under my arms and lifted me off the
floor and I was standing there and I looked down and the floor
was wet.
Q: Could you describe that a little bit for me I know wet
spot pretty much says it all but how large was the wet spot?
A: It wasn't very big and it wasn't a solid spot. I was like
if I- mopped my floor in the kitchen and it dries in spots,
Q:

Streaks?

A: Spots, it will be dry and wet and dry and wet all over in
little spots and that's the way it was.
Q:

Not one large pool or one large spot?

A: It was one spot, in other words around it was not all wet.
It was one spot.
Q:

How big was the one spot?

A:

Probably 18 inches by 18 inches or something.

Q:

Circular?

A:

Yes or 12 inches- just-

Q:

Circular?

A:

Yes, just a round spot.
11

Q:

So maybe a foot?

A: Yes. This is approximate. All I remember is I looked
down and the floor was wet where I was. (Record at 3 88, line
25 to 390, line 8).
FACT 5. That it had not rained or snowed for a few days prior
to the accident.
Q:
[By Rice] Do you recall if there was ice or snow on the
ground outside in the parking lot?
A:
[By Chaffin] There wasn't. In fact it had snowed days
before, I believe. There was snow out, you know, like on the
ground. But I pulled right next to the store, in fact right
in front of the door and there was- it was dry. (Record at
374 lines 1-6).
FACT 6.

That plaintiff was wearing low heeled leather soled

shoes and she did not track in water herself.
Q:
[By Rice]
parking lot?

Was there snow or ice in other parts of the

A:

Yes.

Q:

But not where you walked?

A:

Right.

Q:

What type of shoes were you wearing at the time?

A:

Black leather flats.

(Record at 374, lines 7 to 11).

(Record at 391, lines 5-6).

Q:
Were they dress type shoes for work that you would
wear to work?
A:
Yes. They were just black leather flats, like dress
flats. (Record at 391, line 16 to 19).
Q:
[By William R. Hadley] Did you cause any water to be on
the floor?
A:

[By Chaffin]

Q:

Yes.

Did I cause?

A:
No, unless it was my tears. No I didn't.
lines 21 to 24) .
12

(Record at 449,

These are facts established by the depositions and exhibits
on Record that raise inferences that should preclude summary
judgement.
In Wyatt v. Baughman, supra, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
in length the definition of and use of presumptions of fact,
inferences and their effects on burden of proof. Baughman involved
a case of a bailor whose property was damaged while in possession
of a bailee. A fire occurred with no proof of how it started„

The

bailed goods were destroyed and plaintiff had shown a prima facie
case by; a. the bailment, and b. failure to return, or damage to
the goods.

The court in accepting the minority rule stated that

when a bailor in such case presents the facts of the bailment and
failure to return the property then an inference of negligence
arises that must be presented to a jury.

The defendant/ bailee/

appellee in such a case would then have the burden of persuasion
shifted to their side.
The court in accepting the minority rule stated;
"That the question was for the jury where it could not be said
as a matter of law that the explanation for the mishap was so
satisfactory or complete as to overcome the INFERENCE OF
NEGLIGENCE which the event bespeaks." (Emphasis by Court)
Further;
"THAT THE QUESTION IS A FACTUAL ONE FOR THE JURY UNLESS THERE
IS UNCONTRADICTED, POSITIVE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE ONE WAY OR
THE OTHER THAT NEGLIGENCE DID OR [DID NOT] EXIST WHICH WOULD
ENABLE THE COURT TO DIRECT A VERDICT." Wyatt at 196-97.
(Emphasis by court).
Thus, in this case Ms. Chaff in has placed an inference or
presumption of fact to light based upon the known facts that should
13

be viewed most favorably for her. These include the machine going
over the floor immediately prior to her slipping, her slipping in
the area, her noting sudsy water, the machine distributing soapy
water and Chaffin's absence of negligence.
These facts give rise to the inferences that;
1.

The soapy water was distributed on the floor by the

cleaning machine owned by Albertsons.
2.

Soapy water is normally not found in an area of the store

as described by the parties unless it was left by such a cleaning
machine with the above facts.
3.

Based upon the time, location of the wet spot and the

description of the wet spot in the store immediately prior to the
accident the jury could conclude one of two sources left the spot
and those are; a. the machine left the wet spot, or b. a phantom
shopper with soap on their shoes left the wet spot in the back of
the store.
This case is similar to Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, supra,
decided by this court in July of 1991.

The facts of that case

involved a cart loaded with ice bags on July 3, 1988.

The

appellant was walking in the store and slipped in an unseen spot
of water injuring herself.

She then looked up and saw spots of

water leading to the dripping bags of ice. A witness for appellant
also saw the spots of water.

Based upon the facts, the court

stated that an inference was raised by the appellant and said in
reversing Judge Richard Moffat:
"It is for the jury to decide even as only a matter of
inference whether one of defendant's employees created the
14

risk of harm or whether a phantom shopper, having to move
merchandise about the store in a cart intended only for the
use of store personal was responsible for plaintiff's
injuries." Silcox at 625.
In Silcox, this court relied upon Campbell v. Safeway Stores
Incorporated for its rationale in reversing a defendants judgement
notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff.

Campbell involved

a small box left in an aisle of a grocery store that plaintiff
tripped over sustaining bodily injuries. The court stated in their
decision the question that this appellant would raise to a jury and
that is;
"From these facts and inferences that can be drawn from them
[could] the jury reasonably believe that was a greater
probability that store employees left the box where it was
than that a customer or stranger did [?]" Campbell vs.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 388
P.2d 409 at 411 (Utah 1964)."
Thus, in this case a jury is in a unique position to hear
testimony of the plaintiff, defendant's employee who was running
the machine and the defendant's store manager and meat department
manager about the facts of this case and,
"Based upon the presented facts, by a process of logic and
reason, and upon common experience, the existence of the
assumed fact may be concluded [or not] by the trier of fact."
Wyatt at 198.
This may be a close call for a jury just as it was for Judge Moffat
who stated;
"Well, I understand that— your position thoroughly, and
believe me, I' 7e been reversed o n — on cases like this
before, and I suppose it's, you know, it'll con— it'll happen
again in the future; but by the same token, I just don't
think— and it's just a matter of judgement, it's your
judgement as ai, linst— against mine, I just don't think that
you can stretch it that far. I don't think that you can allow
a jury to make that much of a — speculative decision as to
where that water came from." (Record at 294, lines 14-22).
15

These facts taken together as a whole create a question of
fact that prevents summary judgement.

With the unique collective

wisdom of the jury, they would be in the best position to render
or not

for plaintiff

and this is clearly

a question

that is

suitable for a jury.
XII.
ARGUMENT C
A PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT DOES NOT NEED TO ESTABLISH NOTICE IF
THE CONDITION WAS CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT STOREOWNER.
Albertsons

main

thrust

of

their

argument

by

motion

and

memorandum was;
"Albertsons Motion for Summary should be granted because
Albertsons had no notice, actual or constructive of the
alleged wetness of the floor which allegedly
caused
plaintiff's fall."
They

then

go

on

to

state

that

Summary

Judgement

was

appropriate because there was no evidence that Albertsons either
knew of the substance on the floor which allegedly caused the
plaintiff's fall or that they breached their duty of reasonable
care in failing to discover the condition.

The order granting

Summary Judgement simply stated that Summary Judgement was granted
based upon these arguments.
However, under Utah law as it has evolved over the years no
notice is required if the defendant created the condition that
caused the accident.

In Silcox v. Skaggs, the court stated, "the

variant of this rule, however, is that *if the condition or defect
was created by the defendant himself or his agent or employee, the
notice requirement does not apply.'"
16

Silcox at 624. Citations

omitted.
With the court looking at the inferences raised by the
appellant most favorably, it can then be shown that the machine in
question was owned and purchased by Albertsons and the hours the
floors were cleaned were essentially dictated by Albertsons. Thus,
no notice to Albertsons of the dangerous condition is required to
be shown.
The deposition of Allen Morley, agent/employee of Albertsons,
stated;
Q:
[By Hadley] You say you purchased the machine yourself
back in what month?
A:
[By Morley]
1990.

Well, I purchased the company in March of

Q:
And was the machine that you normally used to clean the
store was that part of the company?
A:

Albertsons supplies the scrubbing machine.

Q:

Did Albertsons show you how to use the scrubbing machine?

A:
Like I stated I picked up the machine from a dealership
here in Salt Lake and their sales people and their maintenance
people showed me how to run it.
Q:

Who purchased the machine?

A:

Albertsons did.

Q:

Albertsons did?

A:

Yes.

(Record at 343 line 21, 344 line 16).

There is also an inference that Albertsons dictated the times
the floors were cleaned depending on the other jobs being performed
in the store.
Q:
[By Rice] When do you usually run the cleaning machine
along that south aisle?
17

A:
[By Morley] Well, generally on freight nights when I
clean the perimeter of the store, the first thing I would
clean would be up front, in front well north of the check
stands, the very front of the store, and then run just an
oval, circular pattern around the whole store.
Q:
So you cleaned all the outside aisles of the store
first then you weaved in and out of the other aisle; is that
safe to say?
A:
On a complete night I would do all the aisles first
and then I'd run the complete thing. (Record at 342 line 1223) .
A:
[By Morley] It would depend. If it was a freight night,
I wouldn't go into the store until approximately 3:00 in the
morning. On any other night I would be in there around 11:00
p.m.
Q:
[By Rice] Do you know whether January 3rd was a freight
night? Do you know what time you would have arrived at the
store?
A:
On that particular night I
approximately three, three thrity.
(Record 316 line 5 to 120).

would have arrived at
It was a freight night.

Thus, we have the defendant owning the machine

and

even

dictating or limiting times that Morley could perform his job in
the store.
Further, Albertsons must take responsibility for this quasiemployee as there was no written contract indicating a contractor
status entered into between Morley and Albertsons.
Q:

[By Rice]

What type of agreement did you have with Rob?

A: [By Morley] It was just a verbal agreement.
and do the floors, that was it.
Q:

There was nothing in writing?

A:

Nothing.

I'd come in

(Record at 307 line 24 to 308 line 3 ) .

Q:
Was there anything at all mentioned about what would
happen or responsibilities of the parties if there was any
type of accident or injury?
18

A:

Nothing like that never came up.

Q:

There was no mention of that at all?

A:

No.

Q:

Is that a no?

A: No there wasn't, I'm sorry.
line 5).

(Record at 308 line 23 to 309

Qs [By Hadley] I'm going to show you what's marked exhibit
two, can you read the top line?
A:
[By Morley] This agreement is made the blank day of
November 1990 by and between Albertsons, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation, and Morley Janitorial Service.
Q:
What is the very top, what is the logo and wording
there?
A:

The Albertsons Janitorial or other services agreement.

Q:
Down on the bottom there is a signature under contractor,
do you recognize that signature?
A:

It's Kelly Morley, that's my brother.

Q:

Have you ever seen a copy of this contract before?

A:
Not until I received the rummons, no, that's the first
I have seen of this. (Record at 352, lines 1 to 15).
Q:

Did you ever sign one of these with Albertsons?

A:
I don't remember signing one, no as far as I know this
is the first time I have seen it, when I got the summons
that's the first I remember seeing one of these. (Record at
353, lines 1 to 5).
Q:

Is he simply an employee of yours?

A:

Correct.

Ql
You gave
agreement?
A:

No.

him

no

authority

to

enter

into

such

an

(Record at 356 line 24 to 357 line 3).

Thus, Summary Judgement upon in the matter of notice was

19

inappropriate and this should be remanded back to the District
Court for trial.
XIII.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The defendants motion fails to demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact and may bring in the issue of
credibility of the witnesses for the defendant. The defendant has
not shown that plaintiff has failed to establish
evidence of an essential element of its claim.
deposition
Albertsons,

and

exhibits

constitutes

of

Allen

relevant

Morley,

and

sufficient
Clearly the

the

employee

of

admissible

evidence

to

establish at the least a question of negligence and causation.
Although much of the evidence in this case is circumstantial it is
sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary standard imposed by the
substantive law.

If the court views the plaintiff's evidence in

a light most favorable to her, the inferences drawn therefrom would
clearly meet the "preponderance of evidence test."

Based upon

testimony and facts and inferences raised by the appellant, if this
case should go to trial the question to be presented to a jury
would be, "Is the probability greater than not that the floor
cleaning machine left this puddle of soapy water versus an unknown
phantom shopper who tracked in a foreign substance all the way to
the back of this grocery store?"

Based upon the following, the

District Court ruling granting Summary Judgement was incorrect and
should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial on the merits.
DATED t h i s 7

day of

/ A / y
faf/sb's,

1994.
(

WILLIAM R. HADLEY
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day of
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1994

I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of the Appellant to the following:
Mitchel T. Rice
Attorney for Appellee
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
DATED this V
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, 1994.
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comfortable style, thus promoting, not inhibiting "ping-pong" custody. The trial
court clearly did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to do so.

1. Negligence <3=>136(14)
Negligence issues become questions of
law only when facts are undisputed and
only one conclusion can be drawn from
them.

CONCLUSION

2. Negligence <3=*48
Mere presence of slippery spot on floor
does not in and of itself establish negligence; proof that slippery or wet substance was on floor does not, without more,
establish that defendant knew or should
have known of the condition.

The trial court properly included evidence as to the children's best interest in
holding that there had been no substantial
change in circumstances which would justify modification of the custody portion of
the original divorce decree. Accordingly,
we affirm.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.

Pat SILCOX, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SKAGGS ALPHA BETA, INC., a Utah
corporation; and Frank Lewis,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 910041-CA.

3. Judgment <s=>181(33)
Whether water in which store customer slipped and fell came from bags of ice on
merchandise cart left in aisle by store employees or whether phantom shopper was
responsible for the slip and fall were questions of fact precluding summary judgment.
4. Judgment <£=>185(2)
Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable
inferences in determining whether there is
material issue of fact which precludes summary judgment against plaintiff.
Matt Biljanic, Midvale, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Philip R. Fishier and Stephen J. Trayner,
Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 3, 1991.
Store customer brought action against
owners to recover from injuries caused by
slip and fall. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J., entered summary judgment in favor of owners. Customer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that whether water in which store customer slipped and fell
came from bags of ice on merchandise cart
left in aisle by store employees or whether
phantom shopper was responsible for the
slip and fall were questions of fact precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
814P.2C*—15

Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME,
JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Plaintiff Pat Silcox appeals from the trial
court's grant of, defendants' motion for
summary judgment. We reverse.
Summary judgment can be granted when
no genuine issue of material fact exists,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P.
56(c); see also Perkins v. Great-West Life
Assurance Co., Nos. 890732-CA, 890733CA, — P.2d
,
(Utah App. June
21, 1991); Robinson v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah
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App.1987). "Any doubts or uncertainties
concerning issues of fact must be construed in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Robinson, 740 P.2d at
263 (citations omitted).
FACTS
On July 3, 1988, plaintiff, her friend
Phyllis Peebles, and plaintiffs two grandchildren entered defendants' store, located
at 7800 Redwood Road, in Salt Lake City,
Utah. As plaintiff proceeded down a dry
goods aisle, she slipped and fell. Plaintiff
stated in her deposition that she saw nothing on the floor before she fell. Peebles,
who was with plaintiff when the Occident
occurred, also stated in her deposition that
prior to plaintiffs fall, she did not see
anything on the floor which may have
caused the fall. However, when she bent
down to help plaintiff up from the floor,
Peebles noticed the floor was wet. Peebles
testified that after plaintiff had been removed from the area where the accident
occurred, Peebles noticed a cart with bags
which contained melting ice. The cart was
of the type typically used to transport merchandise to be stocked, and was located
approximately 115 feet from where plaintiff fell. According to Peebles, there were
spots of water from where the cart was
located leading back to the aisle where
plaintiff fell. Peebles told one of the
store's employees that she believed the
bags of melting ice were the source of the
water on the floor.
Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence,
alleging that the water on the floor caused
her fall. Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, and plaintiff opposed
the motion, claiming her deposition and the
deposition and affidavit of Peebles created
genuine issues of material fact. The trial
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, from which plaintiff appeals.
ANALYSIS
[1] While the Utah Supreme Court has
held "in 'slip and fall' cases that property
owners are not insurers of the safety of
those who come upon their premises,"

Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d
182, 183 (Utah 1991) (citing Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah
1977) and Long v. Smith Food King Store,
531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973)), "summary
judgment should be granted with great
caution where negligence is alleged."
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156
(Utah App.) (citation omitted), cert granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). Such issues
become questions of law only when the
facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from them. See id.
The law is well settled in this state that to
hold an owner or possessor of land liable
for injuries to an invitee, it must be shown
that the owner or occupier knew, or by the
exercise of reasonable care, should have
known, of the existence of a dangerous
condition. See Martin, 565 P.2d at 1140;
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farm,, Inc., 538
P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long, 531 P.2d
at 361. The variant of this rule, however,
is "that if the condition or defect was created by the defendant himself or his agents
or employees, the notice requirement does
not apply." Long, 531 P.2d at 361; see
also Allen, 538 P.2d at 178 (Maughan, J.,
dissenting); Koer v. May fair Mkts., 19
Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967);
Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah
2d 113, 388 P.2d 409, 410 (1964).
[2,3] The mere presence of a slippery
spot on a floor does not in and of itself
establish negligence. This condition may
arise in any place of business for any number of reasons. Proof that a slippery or
wet substance was on a floor, does not,
without more, establish that defendant
knew or should have known of the condition. See generally Allen, 538 P.2d at 176;
Koer, 431 P.2d at 569. However, in the
present case, where the cart on which the
ice was stacked was a cart of the type
typically used by store employees to move
cases of goods, rather than a shopping cart
of the type ordinarily used by customers,
there is a question as to whether the defendants, through one of the store's employees, created the foreseeable risk of harm.
An inference could readily be drawn by the
jury that the water in which plaintiff fell
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came from the bags of ice on the cart left
in the aisle by store employees. Plaintiff
has introduced evidence from the deposition of Peebles which raises such an inference. It is for the jury to decide, even if
only as matter of inference, whether one of
defendants' employees created the risk of
harm, or whether a phantom shopper, given to moving merchandise about the store
on a cart intended only for the use of store
personnel, was responsible for plaintiffs
injuries.
This case is governed by Campbell, and
not, as defendant suggests, by Lindsay v.
Eccles Hotel Co., 3 UtaTi 2d 364, 284 P.2d
477 (1955). In Campbell, the supreme
court set aside the judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant, stating
that from the facts and inferences, "the
jury could reasonably believe that there
was a greater probability that store employees left the box [which plaintiff had
fallen over in defendant's store] where it
was than that a customer or stranger did."
Campbell, 388 P.2d at 411. In Lindsay, on
the other hand, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's judgment that as a matter

of law, the evidence was insufficient to
present a jury question as to defendant's
negligence, where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a slip and fall on defendant's coffee shop floor caused by water
which could have been spilled as easily by a
customer as by an employee. Lindsay, 284
P.2d at 478.
[4] Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable
inferences in determining whether there is
a material issue of fact which precludes
summary judgment. See Robinson, 740
P.2d at 263 (citations omitted). The summary judgment against plaintiff is therefore reversed and the case remanded to the
trial court for trial or such other proceedings as may be appropriate.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
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violated because (1) Officer Slagowski
lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to
detain him beyond the initial purposes of
the stop for a traffic violation, and (2) he
did not voluntarily consent to the search of
the vehicle.1
[1,2] The State concedes that Hewitt's
convictions must be reversed and remanded
because: (1) Hewitt's nervous behavior was
insufficient to give Officer Slagowski a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him
once the initial purposes of the traffic stop
were completed, under State v. Robinson,
797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App.1990);2 and
(2) Hewitt did not voluntarily consent to
the search of the vehicle, pursuant to
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); and
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 436-38. Accordingly, Hewitt's convictions are reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
J7\
(o
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Mary E. CANFIELD, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
ALBERTSONS, INC., Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 910481-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 13, 1992.
In slip-and-fall action arising out of
patron's slipping on lettuce leaf in produce
department of grocery store, the Third Dis1. Hewitt also argues that any consent given to
search the vehicle lacked attentuation from the
initial stop, making the evidence seized inadmissible, and that article I, section 14 of the Utah
Ctt . titution requires that his consent to search
be knowing, as well as voluntary. Because of

trict Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H
Moffat, J., granted summary judgment in
favor of grocer. Plaintiff appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that:
(1) in action challenging grocer's choice of
method of operation, it was not necessary
that plaintiff show that grocer had actual
or constructive notice of particular dangerous condition, i.e., presence of specific lettuce leaf that caused fall, and (2) genuine
issue of material fact as to whether grocer
acted reasonably in its attempts to protect
its customers from dangerous condition
precluded summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Negligence <5=>44, 48
In general, there are two legal theories
under which store owner may be liable for
patron's slip and fall: if store owner knew
or had reason to know of hazardous condition and reasonable opportunity to remedy
same; and where store owner, its agents or
employees create or are responsible for
dangerous condition.
2. Negligence <s=>48
Where store owner chooses method of
operation where it is reasonably foreseeable that expectable acts of third parties
will create dangerous condition, injured
party need not prove either actual or constructive knowledge of specific condition;
in this type of case, notice is satisfied as
matter of law because store owner is
deemed to be informed of dangerous condition since it adopted method of operation.
3. Negligence <&=>48
In slip-and-fall action challenging grocer's choice of method of operation in setting up farmers' pack displays of lettuce
where it was reasonably foreseeable that
expectable acts of third parties would create dangerous condition, it was not necessary that plaintiff show that grocer had
actual or constructive notice of particular
our resolution of the issues above, we need not
address Hewitt's argument on these issues.
2. Accord State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158
(Utah App.1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826
P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App.1992).
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dangerous condition, 1 e , presence of spe- cleaned the produce section, including the
cific lettuce leaf that allegedly caused her area around the lettuce display, on a regular basis
fall
Ms Canfield sustained injuries from her
4. Judgment <S^181(33)
fall
and sued Albertsons to recover for her
Genuine issue of material fact as to
damages
She asserted that it was comwhether grocer took reasonable precaumon
for
lettuce
leaves to be on the floor
tions to protect customers against dangeraround
the
display,
despite Albertsons's efous condition it created by setting up farmforts
ers' pack displays of lettuce precluded sumAlbertsons brought a motion for summary judgment in favor of grocer in shpmary judgment The trial court granted
and fall action
the motion, holding that Ms Canfield failed
to meet her burden of showing that AlbertRoy G Haslam and Valden P Living- sons had either actual or constructive no
ston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel- tice of the particular lettuce leaf upon
lant
which she slipped and fell ] The court furStephen G Morgan, Darwin C Hansen, ther held, as a matter of law, that Albertand Randall D Lund, Salt Lake City, for sons acted reasonably in protecting its pa
trons against any hazard presented by the
defendant and appellee
farmer's pack display
Before BENCH, JACKSON and ORME,
JJ
ISSUES
OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge
Plaintiff Mary Canfield appeals from the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Albertsons We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion
FACTS
Ms Canfield alleges she slipped and fell
on a lettuce leaf while walking through the
produce department of an Albertsons store
Albertsons displayed some of its lettuce in
what is known as a "farmer's pack display " In such a display, lettuce is left in
the boxes in which it arrives from the farm
without the damaged or wilted outer leaves
having been removed As a result, customers often remove and discard the outer
leaves from heads of lettuce they intend to
purchase Albertsons was aware of this
problem and placed empty boxes around
the farmer's pack display in which customers could place the discarded leaves Albertsons also indicated that it patrolled and
1

For purposes of the summary judgment mo
tion the parties and the trial court assumed that
Ms Canfield slipped and fell on a lettuce leaf

Ms Canfield argues on appeal that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of fact existed which should have precluded summary
judgment In addition, Ms Canfield argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted Utah law as requiring her to show
that Albertsons had notice of the specific
lettuce leaf upon which she slipped and fell
Finally, Ms Canfield argues that the trial
court erred in ruling, as a matter of law,
that Albertsons acted reasonably in attempting to eliminate the hazard presented
by the lettuce display We conclude that
the trial court erred in interpreting the law,
and in ruling, as a matter of law, that
jflbertsons took reasonable precautions to
protect its customers
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Larson v Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P 2d 1316, 1319
(Utah App 1991), cert denied, 832 P 2d 476
We therefore also assume that Ms Canfield
slipped and fell on a lettuce leaf However on
remand this may be a contested factual issue
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(Utah 1992). In deciding whether the trial
court correctly determined that there were
no genuine issues of material fact, we do
not defer to the trial court's determination
of whether there are material facts in dispute, but review the facts and inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. Id. Any doubts
or uncertainties concerning issues of fact
are resolved in favor of the losing party.
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah App.1987).
Ms. Canfield also challenges the trial
court's legal conclusions which we review
for correctness, giving no deference to the
trial court. Larson, 818 P.2d at 1319.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Canfield argues that she is not required to show that Albertsons had notice
of the specific lettuce leaf upon which she
slipped and fell if Albertsons created the
dangerous condition. We agree.
We begin our analysis with the general
proposition that "property owners are not
insurers of the safety of those who come
upon their premises." Silcox v. Skaggs
Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah
App.1991). Summary judgment, however,
should be granted with extreme caution
where the negligence of the property owner is alleged. Id. Issues involved in negligence "become questions of law only when
the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from them." Id.
[1] In general, there are two legal theories under which a storeowner may be
found negligent and held liable for a patron's injuries in a "slip and fall" case in
Utah. The first theory involves situations
where there is a temporary or transient
hazard within the store that was not created by the storeowner, its agents, or employees. Under this theory, in order to
find a storeowner negligent, it must be
shown that the storeowner "knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have
known, of any hazardous condition and had
a reasonable opportunity to remedy the
same." Koer v. May fair Markets, 19 Utah
2d 339, 343, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967); accord Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms,

Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long
v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360,
361 (Utah 1973); Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624.
The second theory, which governs the
case before us, involves situations where
the storeowner, its agents, or employees
create or are responsible for the dangerous
condition. Under this theory, a plaintiff
does not need to establish notice since a
storeowner is deemed to have notice of the
dangerous condition it creates. Long, 531
P.2<jl at 361-62 (referring to this theory as a
"variant" of the first theory); accord
Koer, 431 P.2d at 569; Silcox, 814 P.2d at
624. It is here that the trial court has
misinterpreted the law by applying the
analysis governing the first theory, rather
than the analysis governing the second theory, which is the theory at issue.
This second theory usually requires that
the storeowner, its agents, or employees
actually create the condition or defect that
results in an injury to a patron. However,
there is no logical distinction between a
situation in which the storeowner directly
creates the condition or defect, and where
the storeowner's method of operation creates a situation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third
parties will create a dangerous condition or
defect. See De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co.,
5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P.2d 898, 901 (1956)
("a negligent act may be one which 'creates
a situation which involves an unreasonable
risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other [or] a third person' ")
(quoting Restatement of Torts, 11 302(b)).
[2] We therefore reiterate the rule set
forth in De Weese, that where the storeowner chooses a method of operation
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the
expectable acts of third parties will create
a dangerous condition, an injured party
need not prove either actual or constructive
knowledge of the specific condition. Id. at
901. In this type of case, notice is satisfied
as a matter of law because the storeowner
is deemed to be informed of the dangerous
condition since it adopted the method of
operation. See generally Thomason v.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 413
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F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir.1969). "To relieve the
plaintiff of the requirement of proving actual or constructive notice in such instances
is to effect a more equitable balance in
regard to the burdens of proof." Maugeri
v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 357
F.2d 202, 203 (3d Cir.1966) (quoting Bozzo
v. Vornado, 42 N.J. 355, 200 A.2d 777
(1964)).
[3] In this case, Ms. Canfield alleges
that she slipped on a lettuce leaf on the
floor near a display of farmer's pack lettuce. Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Ms. Canfield, Albertsons chose
a method of displaying and offering lettuce
for sale where it was expected that third
parties would remove and discard the outer
leaves from heads of lettuce they intended
to purchase. It was reasonably foreseeable that under this method of operation
some leaves would fall or be dropped on
the floor by customers thereby creating a
dangerous condition. Because Albertsons
chose this method of operation, the question of whether Albertsons had notice, either actual or constructive, is not relevant.
The relevant question is whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to protect
customers against the dangerous condition
it created.
[4] The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Albertsons's actions in this
case, were sufficient to "negate any negligence" on its part. This was error since
the determination of reasonableness, and
negligence, lies within the province of the
jury. "The standard upon which negligence is gauged is that of ordinary, reasonable care under the circumstances, which
standard it is peculiarly fitting that juries
determine." DeWeese, 297 P.2d at 901.
Questions involving reasonableness and
negligence "become questions of law only
when the facts are undisputed and only one
conclusion can be drawn from them." Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624.
Given Albertsons's decision to use farmer's pack displays, the inquiry therefore
becomes whether Albertsons did what was
"reasonably necessary to protect the customer from the risk of injury that mode of
operation is likely to generate." Woller-

man v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J.
426, 221 A.2d 513, 514 (1966). This inquiry
necessarily focuses on the storeowner's actions prior to, or contemporary with, the
creation of the dangerous condition. Each
determination of whether the protective
measures taken were reasonable is fact
sensitive. The circumstances that determine the reasonableness of the protective
measures might include "the type and volume of merchandise, the type of display,
the floor space used for customer service,
the nature of customer service, and the
volume of business." Gonzales v. WinnDixie Louisiana, Inc., 326 So.2d 486, 488
(La. 1976). In any event, the factfinder
must determine whether the storeowner's
vigilance in protecting against a condition
or hazard was commensurate with the risk
created by the method of operation. Wollerman, 221 A.2d at 514.
Albertsons indicated that empty boxes
were placed around the farmer's pack display so that customers could discard
leaves. Further, Albertsons instituted a
regular schedule for inspecting and cleaning the produce section, including the area
around the lettuce display. Ms. Canfield
claims that despite Albertsons's efforts, it
was still common for lettuce leaves to be
on the floor. Specifically, she challenges
Albertsons's assertion that it cleaned the
produce section shortly before her fall.
She also claims that other stores in the
industry use non-skid mats around similar
farmer's pack displays and that Albertsons
was negligent for not doing likewise. Both
Ms. Canfield and Albertsons dispute the
facts gnd inferences presented by the other
side. Viewing the facts and the inferences
drawn therefrom in favor of Ms. Canfield,
we conclude that there was a material issue
of fact involving the question of whether
Albertsons took reasonable 'precautions to
protect its customers from the dangerous
condition it created. It was therefore error
for the trial court to grant Albertsons's
motion for summary judgment.
In so ruling, we are not passing judgment on whether Albertsons was negligent—it is not our function to weigh the
evidence. We note only that reasonable
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minds could differ on the question of
whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to protect its customers. The determination of Albertsons's negligence, if
any, is therefore necessarily reserved for
the factfinder.

ed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, P,J.(
held that defendant's failure to appeal trial
court's ruling that defendant lacked standing to contest search of vehicle constituted
waiver of defendant's claim on appeal that
search was unconstitutional.
Affirmed.

CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court misinterpreted the law. Ms. Canfield is challenging Albertsons's choice of a method of operation where it was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties would create a dangerous conditio*. It
is therefore not necessary that Ms. Canfield show that Albertsons had actual or
constructive notice of the particular dangerous condition, i.e., the presence of the
specific lettuce leaf that allegedly caused
her fall. We also conclude that the trial
court erred in determining, as a matter of
law, that Albertsons acted reasonably in its
attempts to protect its customers from the
dangerous condition. This determination is
fact sensitive and may not be decided as a
matter of law.
We reverse the summary judgment and
remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.

1. Searches and Seizures <5=>161
Standing is threshold question when
asserting Fourth Amendment rights.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
2. Criminal Law e=>1178
Drug defendant's failure to appeal trial court's ruling that defendant lacked
standing to contest search of vehicle constituted waiver of defendant's claim on appeal
that search was unconstitutional; unappealed ruling that defendant lacked standing remained law of case. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
Milton T. Harmon, Nephi, for defendant
and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.
OPINION

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Moises Prado RODRIGUEZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 910636-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 13, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Juab County, Boyd L. Park,
J., of possession of cocaine, and he appeal-

BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iv) (Supp.1992). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant, a California resident, was
driving a van on Interstate 15 at 83 miles
per hour when he was stopped for speeding. He was accompanied by Arnoldo Pa*
dilla. Defendant provided the trooper with
a vehicle registration indicating that the
van was registered to a Noal Reyes. The
trooper testified that when he asked who
the van belonged to, they indicated that it
belonged to "Armando."
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15 Utah 2d 113
Leone C A M P B E L L , Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

paired eyesight was contributorily negligent
in fading to see small box over which she
tripped in grocery store aisle was for jury.

SAFEWAY STORES, INCORPORATED,
a corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 9802.

{Supreme Court of L'tah.
Jan. 17, VM)A.

5. Damages C=>208(l)
Assessment of d a m a g e s is something
peculiarly within prerogative of jury and
court is extremely reluctant to interfere
with j u r y j u d g m e n t in t h a t regard.
6. Damages C=>I32(I5)

Action against store operator for injuries sustained by plaintiff-customer when
s ) u . |\-11 over a small box in an aisle of the
T h e T h i r d District Court, Salt L a k e
M ,, r i ..
Cuiintv, Aldon J. A n d e r s o n , J., g r a n t e d
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff and the plaintiff appealed. T h e S u p r e m e Court, Crockett, !-, held that questions of negligence and
contributor)' negligence were (or the j u r y .
O r d e r g r a n t i n g j u d g m e n t notwithstanding verdict set aside.
1 L i i n o d , C. J., dissented.
I. Negligence £^136(22)
W h e t h e r leaving small box in g r o c e r y
store aisle w h e r e people a r e expected to be
preoccupied in s e a r c h i n g shelves for g r o ceries constituted unreasonable risk of h a r m
to them and was t h e r e f o r e negligence is
jury question.
2. Negligence e=^l34(3)

T h a t grocery store operator's servants
placed box in aisle w h e r e customer tripped
over ir cannot be found from speculation
and conjecture but there must be sound
basis in evidence from which it can reasonably he determined that there is g r e a t e r
probability that box was left there by employee than otherwise.
3. Negligence O I 3 6 ( l 5 )
W i n ! her there was greater

probability

that store employees left small box in aisle
when- plaintiff-customer tripped over it
than that customer or s t r a n g e r did was for
jury.
4. Negligence C=»I36(27)
W hether woman of about 60 suffering
irum Parkinson's disease and h a v i n g im-

A w a r d of $14,053.26 in favor of 60year-old woman who sustained injuries including fracture of neck of femur, as a result of which her locomotion was permanently impaired was not so beyond reason
as to require that r e v i e w i n g court upset it
by g r a n t i n g additur, though she had sustained medical, hospital and related expenses of approximately $8,000.
7. Trial C^I43
W h e n e v e r there is genuine dispute as
to issues of fact, parties a r c entitled to have
it submitted to and settled by jury, and
when parties have had full and fair opportunity to present their cause and jury
has rendered its verdict, it should not be
interfered with unless there appears some
compelling reason why justice demands that
it be done.

Shirley P. Jones, Jr., G. Kenneth H a n d ley, Jr., Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Ray, Ouinncy & Ncbekcr, Marvin J.
Bertoch, L. Ridd L a r s o n , Salt Lake City,
for respondent.
C R O C K E T T , Justice.
PlaiiftiiT, Mrs. Leone. Campbell, sued for
injuries suffered when she tripped ami fell
over a small cardboard box m an aisle of
the defendant's supermarket located at 4th
South and Ninth Last in Salt Lake City.
A jury found a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for $14,053.26. Subsequently the
trial court g r a n t e d defendant's motion for
judgment
notwithstanding
the
verdict.
Plaintiff appeals seeking (1) reversal of
that ruling and reinstatement of the verdict,
and (2) an additur to the verdict, or m the
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alternative, a new trial on t h e issues of
d a m a g e s only.
Plaintiff is a woman of a b o u t 60, stated
to be "of advanced y e a r s / ' a c h a r a c t e r i z a tion which is, of course, entirely dependent
upon one's point of view.
S h e had for
some y e a r s been in ill health, suffering from
P a r k i n s o n ' s Disease. A t the time of t h e
accident she was on some n e w medication
which had greatly improved h e r condition,
so that she was able to m o v e about quite
well. H e r eyesight was also impaired : she
had a fully developed c a t a r a c t in the right
eye, so that her vision w r as reduced to light
perception o n l y ; a considerable degree of
n e a r s i g h t e d n e s s in the left eye, for which
she normally used glasses. B u t at the time
of this incident she was not w e a r i n g them.

Because of the crippling of the hip joint,
her locomotion is p e r m a n e n t l y impaired.
Defendant's

Negligence

[1] Tt is hardly open to question that
reasonable minds could believe that the
leaving oi such a box in the aisle, where
people a r e expected to be preoccupied in
searching the shelves for g r o c e r i e s , would
create a h a z a r d exposing o t h e r s to an unreasonable risk of h a r m . 1 T h a t d a n g e r to
customers is reasonably to be apprehended
from such a circumstance is shown by the
defendant's store m a n a g e r , Mr. Douglas
VVilley, who testified to the c a r e he personally observed and urged upon his employees
to keep the aisles free of boxes a n d merchandise in the interest of safety.

M r s . Campbell resided with her adult
d a u g h t e r , J e a n n e . As w a s t h e i r custom,
they went to the d e f e n d a n t ' s store to do
their weekly shopping at about 8 p. m. on
F r i d a y evening, when it w a s not very busy.
As they browsed along the aisles, selecting
desired items, J e a n n e pushed the grocery
c a r t and plaintiff followed a l o n g .
Just
prior to this accident they p r o c e e d e d eastw a r d to the end of one aisle and t u r n e d left
to go w e s t w a r d into the n e x t one, with
J e a n n e and the c a r t slightly a h e a d of plaintiff, the latter searching the shelves for a
particular b r a n d of dog food. W h e n they
had proceeded but a few feet, plaintiff
tripped over a small empty c a r d b o a r d box
in the aisle, precipitating h e r to t h e floor
and causing w h a t she c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " t e r rific pain." J e a n n e assisted h e r in getting
to the £ar. S h e continued to suffer e x t r e m e
pain, and the n e x t evening in a r i s i n g from
her chair, she felt something " s n a p " in her
hip. Upon being taken to the hospital, X r a y s revealed that she h a d sustained a
fracture of the neck of the femur. Omitting unnecessary detail, it is sufficient to
say that a l t h o u g h the plaintiff w a s obliged
to undergo s u r g e r y several times, it proved
impossible to get a good union of the bone.

[2, 3] A more crucial question is whether the evidence will justify a finding that
the d e f e n d a n t ' s servants placed the box
there. D e f e n d a n t is w a r r a n t e d in insisting
that this fact cannot be found from speculation and conjecture, but t h e r e must be a
sound basis in the evidence from which it
can reasonably be determined that t h e r e is
a greater probability that the box w a s left
there by an employee t h a n otherwise."
F a c t s shown by the evidence which might
be regarded as h a v i n g a significant bearing
on that question are t h e s e : t h a t this was
quite a small b o x ; only six inches high, by
one foot wide and a foot and a half long;
t h a t it was of a type which some of the
canned goods come in which the clerks remove and place on the s h e l v e s ; t h a t it
would be quite unusual for a c u s t o m e r to be
using a c a r d b o a r d box in the m e r c h a n d i s e
a r e a ; and even more so to be u s i n g one of
this small s i z e ; that c u s t o m e r s usually do
not do so, but use shopping c a r t s for
g a t h e r i n g their purchases, then go t h r o u g h
the c h e c k s t a n d s ; that the c h e c k e r s place
the items purchased in large sacks, or in
some instances in b o x e s ; if boxes a r e used
for this purpose, they are usually larger
than the box referred to. F r o m these facts,
a n d inferences that can be drawm from

I. Sot Ilillyunl v. Utah By-Products Co., 1
Utah 2d 143, 2H3 P.2d 2S7.

2. Alvnrado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 1G, 2GS P.
2d 98G.
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them, the jury could reasonably believe that
there was a greater probability that store
employees left the box where it was than
that a customer or stranger did. This case
is distinguishable from Lindsey v. Eccles
Hotel. 3 There the plaintiff slipped on
water spilled on the floor of a cafe. Both
employees and customers had access to the
water, so it would have involved mere
conjecture as to who spilled it.
The foregoing conclusion renders it unnecessary for us to be critically concerned
with plaintiff's further argument that the
issue of defendant's negligence was properly submitted because the checker at the end
of the aisle had a clear view of the area in
question for a sufficient interval of time
that the checker could have seen the box
and removed it. But due to the dispute
between the parties about it, it appears
likely that a jury question existed as to that
matter also.
Plaintiff's Contributory

Negligence

[4] C^Ve agree that ordinarily one is
guilty of contributory negligence which will
preclude recovery if she fails to see and
give heed to a danger which is plain to be
seen.4 However, as we have held on a
number of occasions, this rule is not strictly
applicable where there are extenuating circumstances which impair the ability to see
the hazard. 5 They were present in the
instant case in that plaintiff's daughter was
going just ahead of her with the grocery
cart; and that plaintiff was preoccupied in
searching the shelves for certain merchandise^:; There is the further fact that it
would not be unreasonable for one to proceed with at least some degree of assurance
that these aisles are clear of impedimenta.
JJnder such circumstances, it is our opinion
that a jury question existed as to whether
3. 3 Utah 2d 304, 284 P.2d 477.
4. Pulley v. Mid-Western Dairy, SO Utah
331, 15 P.2d 309; Clark v. Union Pacific
R. R., 70 Utah 29, 257 P. 1050.
5. Nee discussion in Federated Milk Producers v. Statewide Plumb. & Htg., 11
Utah 2d 295, 358 P.2d 348 and casea therein cited.

the plaintiff was observing the standard of
care of an ordinary, reasonable and prudent
person for her own safetyT}
Inadequacy of Damages
In support of her contention that the
award of $14,053.26 is so small in comparison to her actual injury and damage
that justice demands that this court order
an additur, 6 or a new trial on the issue of
damages, plaintiff points out that she has
already incurred medical, hospital and related expenses of approximately $8,000,
leaving only about $6,000 as general damages for pain and suffering and to take
care of future expenses. In that connection, it should be remembered that the
plaintiff had long been ii* ill health; that
she was not shown to be gainfully employed, but lived with her daughter.
[5, 6] Due to their advantaged position
in close proximity to the trial, the parties
and the witnesses; and their practical
knowledge of the affairs of life as a background against which to weigh the evidence,
the assessment of damages is something
peculiarly within the prerogative of the
jury to determine, and the court is extremely reluctant to interfere with their
judgment in that regard. 7 From the plaintiff's point of view, her insistence that the
award is inadequate to her needs and
desires is understandable. But we are
obliged to look at the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
verdict. In doing so, we do not see it as so
entirely beyond reason as to require that we
upset it. 8
[7] Under our system it is contemplated
that the right to trial by jury be assured.
This is something more than a high-sound6. See Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42,
327 P.2d 826.
7. Stamp v. Union Pacific R. R., 5 Utah 2d
397, 303 P.2d 279.
8. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35,
327 P.2d 822.
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ing phrase to be declaimed on patriotic
occasions. It is the duty of courts to honor
it in the observance. Whenever there is
genuine dispute as to issues of fact upon
which the parties' rights depend, they are
entitled to have them submitted to and
settled by a jury. 9 When the parties have
had a full and fair opportunity to present
their cause, and the jury has rendered its
verdict, it should not be interfered with
unless there appears some compelling reason why justice demands that it be don^.
We find none here. Accordingly, the verdict and the award of damages as found by
the jury must stand. The order granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set
aside. Costs to plaintiff (appellant).
MCDONOUGH,
CALLISTER,
WADE, JJ., concur.

and

HENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent, disagreeing with the main
opinion's assertion that the instant case is
distinguishable from Lindsey v. Eccles
Hotel. The main opinion says "There the
plaintiff slipped on water spilled on the
floor of a cafe. Both employees and
customers had access to the water, so it
would have involved mere conjecture as to
who spilled it." Almost identical circumstances existed in the store, so it would
have involved mere conjecture as to who
placed the box on the floor.
In the Lindsey case we said the same
thing as has the main opinion and yet we
arrived at an opposite result, when we
asserted that "there was no evidence as to
how the wJter got onto the floor, by whom
it was deposited, exactly when it arrived
there or that the defendant had knowledge
of its presence" so that "under such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to
speculate that the defendant was negligent."
It is elementary that a plaintiff has the
burden of showing negligence on the part
9. See Htatcmcnt in Stickle v. Union P. R,
It., 122 Utah 477, 251 P.2U 807.

of defendant, and the showing here was, in
my opinion, less impressive than in the
Lindsey case. It is also elementary that a
defendant knew of the hazard or reasonably
should have known of it, and the opimoi.'b
recitation of the facts that here was a little
box of the type used in grocery stores
usually not used by customers does not
show a jury question, and it is far from
proving negligence. 1
It seems to me that under the facts adduced that proved nothing in the way of
compensable negligence, makes the store
owner an absolute insurer, far beyond any
theory of liability based on a business invitee theory.

O
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15 Utah 2d 118
Harold BURLEIGH, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State
Prison, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 10007.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 23, 1904.

Habeas corpus case. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, R. LeRoy Tuckett, J., entered order denying the petition,
and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
Callister, J., held that judgment denying
writ of habeas corpus was res judicata in
later proceeding wherein writ of habeas
corpus was sought on same grounds.
Appeal dismissed.

I. Habeas Corpus €=5|20
Judgment denying writ of habeas corpus was res judicata in later proceeding
I. See HIHO Hampton v. Rowley, 10 Utah
2d 109, 350 P.2d 151 (1900); Safeway
Stores v. Ciner (Okl.), 380 P.2d 712
(19G3).

